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Abstract 
Objectivity and transparency are often considered to be desirable attributes of a 
performance measurement and incentive system. Subjectivity, on the other hand,  
is typically equated with bias and has a negative connotation. But accounting research 
shows us that a degree of subjectivity, in other words, allowing leeway for supervisors’ 
judgments in evaluations, is usually optimal. I argue that we should switch to the term 
‘discretion’, to be better able to communicate its benefits. Moreover, I discuss the 
benefits and costs of discretion and of transparency. I surmise that a balance between 
objectivity and discretion is required, and that transparency is definitely not always 
desirable. Furthermore, I discuss how discretion relates to the way in which managers 
are held accountable. Holding managers accountable for outcomes is not always 
optimal, yet pervasive. Finally, I outline future research opportunities on discretion  
and accountability, apply the insights about performance measurement to the 
academic working environment, and promote the use of new research methods.
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Samenvatting 
Objectiviteit en transparantie worden vaak gezien als wenselijke kenmerken van een 
prestatiemeet- en beloningssysteem. Subjectiviteit, aan de andere kant, wordt meestal 
geassocieerd met ‘bias’ of vertekening en heeft een negatieve connotatie. Accounting 
onderzoek laat ons echter zien dat een mate van subjectiviteit, ofwel een rol voor het 
oordeel van de leidinggevende in evaluaties, veelal optimaal is. Ik beargumenteer dat 
we zouden moeten overstappen op de term ‘discretion’ (beoordelingsvrijheid), om  
de voordelen ervan beter te kunnen communiceren. Voorts illustreer ik de voordelen 
van ‘discretion’ en van transparantie, alsmede de nadelen. Ik stel dat een balans tussen 
objectiviteit en ‘discretion’ vereist is, en dat transparantie zeker niet altijd gewenst is. 
Verder bespreek ik hoe ‘discretion’ gerelateerd is aan de wijze waarop managers 
verantwoordelijk gehouden worden (‘accountability’). Managers verantwoordelijk 
houden voor resultaten is niet altijd optimaal, maar veelvoorkomend. Tenslotte beschrijf 
ik toekomstige onderzoeksmogelijkheden over ‘discretion’ en ‘accountability’, pas ik  
de inzichten over prestatiemeting toe op de academische werkomgeving, en propageer 
ik het gebruik van nieuwe onderzoeksmethoden.
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1. Introduction
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Geacht College van Decanen,
Distinguished colleagues,
Dear family, friends, 
Dear guests.
The field of Accounting and Incentives studies how the use of performance measures 
affects judgment and decision-making. Selecting and implementing performance 
measures in organizations provides managers and employees with (implicit) economic 
and social incentives for performance. If well designed, a performance measurement 
system (or accounting system) helps to make an organization’s members act 
congruently with its strategy and ensures that they make economically sound decisions. 
If ill designed, the system is likely to provide perverse incentives and lead to suboptimal 
behavior by managers and employees. Thus, holding managers and employees 
accountable for well-chosen performance measures and providing them with 
appropriate incentives is crucial to organizational success.
This brings me to the title of my inaugural address: Utilizing Incentives and 
Accountability: In Control In Control? The study of Accounting and Incentives has 
overlap with the field of Management Control or simply Control. Are we in control in 
the field of Control? Are we utilizing incentives and accountability for performance in 
proper ways in organizations, to be and stay in control? And, is our knowledge about 
this well-developed and developing well? 
To address these challenging, broad questions, I will focus primarily on a pervasive 
related question: How much should we rely on objective performance measures to 
hold individuals accountable and incentivize them? I have encountered and participated 
in recurring discussions on this theme with students, controllers, and executives in 
classrooms, as well as in management meetings. A frequently voiced position in such 
discussions is that objectivity is a good attribute, as is transparency, and that more of 
both will improve the measurement and evaluation system. In my address, however, 
one of the central arguments is that managers should resist tendencies to focus only on 
easily, objectively measurable results to gauge performance and incentivize individuals. 
In a similar vein, more transparency is not always better.
In the next sections, I will first explain several lessons learnt about the design of a 
performance measurement system, which forms the basis for providing incentives. I will 
outline that measurement systems using objective measures can benefit organizations, 
but can typically only solve part of the puzzle. Perhaps counterintuitively, a degree of 
subjectivity in performance measurement is often optimal, despite its negative 
connotation. Thus, managers should resist temptations to hold subordinates 
accountable for objective outcomes only. 
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Insights from accounting research studies can help managers in finding ways of doing 
so. To illustrate, I discuss the interrelated topics of performance measurement systems 
and objective measures (section 2), subjectivity or discretion (section 3), transparency 
(section 4), and accountability (section 5). 
In the last two sections, I will address the theme ‘in control in Control’. Specifically,  
I describe how I believe we can and should move research in this field forward. To that 
end, I outline opportunities for further research in section 6 with a focus on discretion 
and accountability, their interrelation, and on research methods. These opportunities 
align with my own research plans for the coming years. In section 7, I proceed with the 
same theme by applying the knowledge acquired from studying organizations’ 
measurement, accountability, and incentive structures to our own work as researchers. 
Specifically, I will make recommendations about how we conduct and evaluate 
research and how we can further shape and improve our own measurement and 
evaluation system. 
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2. Objective performance measurement systems
One of the main lessons learnt in the field of Accounting and Incentives is that an 
organization’s performance measurement system should be geared to the 
circumstances and, in general, be balanced. Below, I explain why this is so important 
and that this implies that fully objective systems are likely to fail. 
Incentivizing managers and employees based on objective performance measures and 
targets can lead to positive organizational outcomes. First, effort and performance 
levels may increase. Employing clear measurement systems can also enhance 
organizational members’ sense of direction; i.e., provide clarity about which types of 
actions and decisions are desirable to achieve the organization’s strategic objectives 
(e.g., Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Consistent with this notion, in a survey study with Frank 
Verbeeten, I showed that public sector organizations could benefit from a stronger 
emphasis on objective performance measures. Our data shows that this stronger 
emphasis can enhance perceived mission clarity, thus advancing employees’ sense of 
direction, which consequently increases motivation (Van Rinsum & Verbeeten, 2012). 
Directing managers’ and employees’ behavior by utilizing objective performance 
measurement can be very beneficial.
A solidly developed accounting or measurement system is crucial for organizational 
success, but designing a measurement system that provides managers with a sense of 
direction that is in line with the organization’s strategy and objectives, represents a 
significant challenge. Ultimately desirable outcomes often are, and need to be, defined 
in financial terms. Accounting measures, such as profit and return on investment, 
therefore play a significant role in performance measurement systems, and their usage 
can greatly benefit the organization. 
There is, however, also evidence that using accounting performance measures can 
evoke short-termism, or myopia — an excessive focus on achieving near term results at 
the expense of long-term value-creating investments (e.g., Merchant, 1990). 
Accounting measures such a profit inherently reflect results that have already been 
achieved. These measures can be boosted in the short run (only) by, for instance, 
lowering quality or service levels or investing sub-optimally low amounts in long-term 
projects (Graham, Harvey, & Rajpogal, 2005). Therefore, managers can benefit by 
increasing short-term accounting performance at the cost of future results. Moreover, 
high reliance on objective accounting performance measures can instigate fraud and 
lead to peak levels of managerial risk-taking (e.g., at ENRON; Healy & Palepu, 2003). 
In fact, banking too much on any single performance measure, or a limited set of 
performance measures, is risky. Accounting and other performance measures vary in 
their characteristics and all have their individual strengths and weaknesses (Gibbs et al., 
2009). Performance measure properties such as accuracy, controllability 
(influenceability versus noise), congruence with organizational objectives,  
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and timeliness all differ across metrics and can differentially affect judgments and 
decisions. For example, a lack of controllability can cause perceived unfairness, as 
managers typically dislike being responsible for results which they cannot significantly 
influence. This, in turn, may lead to manipulation.
The strengths and weaknesses inherent in measures demonstrate a trade-off in 
objective performance measurement systems. On the one hand, emphasis on such 
systems enhances motivation; on the other hand, they can stimulate dysfunctional 
behavior. At middle-management level, optimally designing a performance 
measurement system is particularly challenging. At this level, a system comprised of 
multiple measures is typically indicated, such as a Balanced Scorecard (BSC; Kaplan & 
Norton, 2001). A well-designed measurement system not only includes accounting 
measures (imperfectly) representing periodic economic value creation, but also 
measures that drive these financial results. A system that measures strategic, 
non-financial, performance dimensions can ensure that managers also focus on 
long-term performance. Such measures, customer satisfaction for instance, are 
considered leading indicators that are predictive of future value creation. Including 
these measures in a performance measurement system in combination with ‘lagging’ 
accounting measures (such as profit or return on investment) can provide better 
alignment with the organizational objectives and allow managers to strike the right 
balance between the short- and long-term consequences of their decisions (Kaplan & 
Norton, 2001). 
Balance is also desirable in terms of performance measure properties (e.g., 
controllability), to compensate the relative weakness of one measure regarding a 
specific property with another measure that is strong on that particular property (Gibbs 
et al., 2009). Yet even when one keeps these balances in mind, determining the weight 
to be set on each performance measure for evaluation and incentive purposes is 
notoriously difficult. For motivational purposes, it may be wise to prespecify these 
weights. This, however, possibly and often likely evokes ‘gaming’ of the prespecified 
measurement and evaluation system, as managers can now focus too much on the 
measures in the accounting system that are, for example, most influenceable and thus 
lead to the biggest improvement in their evaluations and rewards. Managers may even 
lose sight of the organization’s strategy and start to view maximizing their performance 
measures as the ultimate goal; the surrogation effect (Choi, Hecht, & Tayler, 2012).
Hence, even a measurement system with multiple indicators threatens to result in 
dysfunctional effects. This brings me to the central tenet of my speech. Holding 
managers accountable for outcomes only in an objective, fully transparent manner is 
not as good an idea as one may think. In fact, this may have strong adverse effects and 
cause accounting scandals rather than prevent them. Nevertheless, in my experience, 
more objectivity (and transparency) is often advocated in discussions about 
measurement system design. I conclude that there seems to be a tendency to overrely 
on accountability for objective outcomes, which tallies with recent research findings 
(Bol & Smith, 2011; Dai, Kuang, & Tang, 2018).
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Again, a balance is needed, namely between objectivity and subjectivity. Subjectivity 
refers to supervisors’ discretion to rate performance or adjust performance evaluations. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, subjectivity in performance measurement and evaluation is 
generally a good thing, as it allows coping with unforeseen circumstances and 
situational nuances. I will explain this in more detail next. 
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3. Subjectivity or discretion
In this section, I outline costs and benefits of the opposite of objectivity: subjectivity.  
I describe where the negative connotations of subjectivity likely originate from and I 
highlight insights from accounting research on the topic, including some of my own 
studies. These insights reveal that subjectivity is often beneficial.
In a fully objective system, performance evaluations are determined formulaically based 
on objective measures and weights. The formula is determined ex ante, i.e., at the 
beginning of the evaluation period. As an example, the following measurement system, 
coupled with a bonus, could apply to a sales- or business unit manager: 5 % of net 
margin on sales (over a specific period) is paid out as a bonus, plus a lump-sum bonus if 
a certain minimum target customer satisfaction score is obtained. The latter could be 
the average score given by customers for the product and sales service, for example, on 
a scale of 1-10. Both sales and the customer satisfaction score are objective measures. 
It is a clear, unambiguous preset system. It is objective and transparent.
An objective measurement and evaluation system reduces uncertainty about the 
process. But, this comes at a cost: there is no way to deal with the effect of 
environmental uncertainty (unless it is somehow built into the formula, which is not 
always possible). Effects of unpredictable events and circumstances that affect the 
manager’s possibilities to generate sufficient sales influence the outcome of the 
formula and hence the manager’s bonus. Unless a manager can foresee an uncertain 
event that will adversely affect results, it may not be fair to allow his or her bonus to 
drop significantly.
Another cost of rigidly applying an objective evaluation system is the inability to correct 
the outcome for any opportunistic behavior that may occur. For example, a manager 
subject to the earlier example bonus system may decide to ignore the effects on 
customer satisfaction, if the bonus based on this measure is relatively small. Instead, he 
or she may try to push a higher sales volume to customers, e.g., by overrepresenting 
products’ usefulness to specific customers. This can boost the manager’s bonus in the 
current period, which is in the manager’s self-interest provided that (s)he is moving on 
to another job soon after. Thus, a rigid objective system can evoke short-termism.
Is subjectivity in evaluations a solution? It involves evaluating based on the supervisor’s 
judgment. Over the years, I have learned that many students, executives, and colleagues 
deem subjectivity to be undesirable. Basically, they equate it with bias. And they have a 
point, as accounting studies have indeed documented biased evaluations when 
superiors have a significant influence on the outcome. Compared to fully objective 
systems, subjective evaluations can exhibit leniency bias, centrality or compression bias, 
recency bias, an outcome effect, and favoritism. Leniency bias occurs when superiors 
evaluate subordinates’ performance more positively than actual performance warrants 
(Bol, 2011; Moers, 2005). Centrality bias occurs when compressed evaluations take 
place, leading to reduced dispersion with few subordinates evaluated as stellar or bad 
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performers (Kampkötter & Sliwka, 2018; Moers, 2005). Both biases are at least partly 
due to a desire to avoid costly discussions with subordinates (Bol, 2011). Recency bias  
is present when recent failures or successes are overweighted in an evaluation (e.g., 
Arnold et al., 2002). The outcome effect entails that an evaluator dislikes negative 
outcomes and appreciates positive ones, regardless of the decision-making process 
and risk involved (Ghosh & Lush, 2000). Finally, favoritism leads to inaccuracies in 
evaluations, which is the case when supervisors rate subordinates they personally like 
better relatively high (Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003). I have found perceived favoritism 
by subordinates to be quite pervasive in my own surveys, which is potentially 
problematic irrespective of whether superiors actually play favorites. 
Given all these potentially occurring biases and inaccuracies, should we even consider 
employing subjectivity in measurement and evaluation systems? The answer is a 
definitive ‘yes’. Accounting research shows us why. In essence, incorporating discretion 
in evaluations achieves more flexibility. First, it allows for evaluations on aspects of 
performance that are not easily objectively defined or evaluated (Gibbs et al., 2004), 
such as creativity, innovativeness, and cooperativeness. Moreover, subjectivity is used 
more frequently and pervasively in practice when more opportunities for manipulation 
exist, and in circumstances where a long-term managerial orientation is more desirable. 
To illustrate, better growth opportunities and longer product development and life 
cycles are positively associated with subjectivity (Bushman, Indejikian, & Smith, 1996), as 
is the use of objective performance measures that are more susceptible to manipulation 
(Gibbs et al., 2004). This evidence on the determinants of the use of subjectivity 
strongly suggests that subjectivity helps to prevent dysfunctional behavior such as 
manipulation and myopia. 
There are more positive aspects to subjectivity. Superiors use it to correct for 
unforeseen adverse circumstances that subordinates may encounter, such as a 
suddenly declining market size or a competitor unexpectedly entering the market. 
Corrections for such uncertain events can ensure that evaluations are fairer or are at 
least perceived as such (Bol, Hecht, & Smith, 2015; Van Rinsum, 2015). Deviations in 
outside factors affecting results are not always impossible to foresee, nor is it always  
the case that the effects of outside influences cannot be countered. For instance, 
market shrinkage can sometimes be predicted and the effects of exchange rate 
movements can be undone through hedging. To motivate managers to think ahead,  
for instance to anticipate likely states of the market, discretion is often needed (Bol et 
al., 2015). This allows supervisors to employ their professional judgment. They can then 
stick to the objectively measured results if managers could or should have been able to 
foresee the changes that occurred in the business environment. Or they can adjust 
evaluations and rewards if complicating outside factors were truly unforeseen and/or 
the effects thereof could not be anticipated and countered (Bol et al., 2015). Using 
discretion in this manner provides managers with incentives to work hard and directs 
their efforts strategically. Introducing subjectivity can thus turn an objective system into 
a more balanced one. 
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A study I undertook with Victor Maas and Kristy Towry provides another example of the 
benefits of discretion. We investigated whether superiors are willing to make a personal 
sacrifice to enhance the accuracy of their evaluations, by filtering out a noisy factor. 
Specifically, we investigated evaluators’ willingness to pay for information that would 
help them to determine the relative contribution to team performance of each of two 
team members. In practice, supervisors can often easily observe team performance, but 
not each individual team member’s contribution. At a cost and by investing time, for 
instance by interviewing peers or monitoring regularly, supervisors can acquire 
additional information about individual efforts. In our experimental study, we find that 
when supervisors have the power to adjust individual evaluations, they are indeed 
willing to incur personal costs to gather such additional information. They consequently 
use this information to improve their individual performance evaluation and bonus 
allocation decisions, by punishing slackers and rewarding high contributors. In doing so, 
supervisors ensure that evaluations are fair and reciprocate subordinates’ trust in them 
(Maas, Van Rinsum, & Towry, 2012). Our study thus demonstrates that supervisors 
intend to improve the accuracy and fairness of individual performance measures and 
evaluations, even when it is costly to them personally and they do not benefit from it 
themselves. Again, subjectivity works out positively.
The abovementioned advantages of subjectivity apparently make it a very useful tool. 
Subjectivity is an integral part of many firms’ performance measurement and evaluation 
systems (e.g., Murphy & Cleveland, 1991). Given the negative connotations it has to 
many people, its widespread use, and its many potential positive effects, I advocate that 
we stop using the label subjectivity. As the antonym of objectivity it may be an intuitive 
label to accounting researchers, but it equates to bias or a mostly random judgment for 
most others. Hence, I believe we would be better off using the more neutral term 
discretion, especially in our conversations with students and practitioners. This can help 
disseminate the research findings on this topic and enhance our impact in the business 
community, and I will therefore refer to discretion henceforth.
In sum, we should all realize the significant benefits that discretion has to offer in 
performance measurement and evaluation systems. In my experience, tendencies to 
over focus on objectivity and the accompanying ex ante transparency are frequently 
(too) strongly represented in related discussions. Designing an upfront fully transparent 
objective system should not be our ultimate goal. Rather, measurement and evaluation 
procedures should achieve a balance between objectivity and discretion, and 
discussions should reflect this. 
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4. Transparency 
Thus far, I have argued that upfront transparency, in the form of objective measurement 
and evaluation of an individual’s performance, is not the paramount objective in 
performance measurement. It is important to note, however, that transparency is a 
much broader concept that does not equate to objectivity. In this section, I address 
transparency as a central concept in performance measurement and evaluation. 
I illustrate transparency and its effects in a broader context, discuss whether 
transparency generally is a good thing, and examine whether discretion and 
transparency are necessarily at odds with each other. 
Information policy. Transparency in performance measurement systems also relates to 
whether or not peers are informed about each other’s performance. Accounting 
research has examined how an organization’s information or reporting policy affects 
behavior (Evans et al., 2016). Under an open policy, individual performance levels are 
known among peer groups of managers, while under a closed policy such information 
is not available to individuals. Together with Victor Maas, I conducted an experimental 
study on the effects of different information policies on reporting honesty. Our findings 
indicate that managers, whose performance reports are made public, tend to report 
their own performance level more truthfully. When all performance reports are public, 
being dishonest by manipulating one’s own performance to a high level presents a 
more easily observable infraction of social norms. Managers, who care about the 
impression they leave on their peers, thus tend to be more truthful in their performance 
reports in such situations than under a non-transparent, closed information policy 
(Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013). Reducing performance measure manipulation is an 
important effect of employing an open information policy, given that managers often 
have some leeway in reporting periodic results — for instance, they can delay or 
accelerate making provisions or maintenance. In sum, this form of transparency can 
help mitigate performance measure manipulation. We can, however, not conclude that 
more transparency is generally better, because studies with a different focus document 
both positive and negative effects (Bol, Kramer & Maas, 2016; Evans et al., 2016). Below, 
I illustrate this further.
Relative performance evaluation. In a more competitive environment, the effects of 
transparency about individual performance levels among peers may contrast those of 
Maas and Van Rinsum (2013). Outperforming others can then become most important 
to an individual, and transparency can lead to more instead of less manipulation (e.g., 
Brüggen & Luft, 2011). This brings me to a prolific subset of the literature that 
investigates the effects of relative performance information. Research has shown that 
evaluations based on relative performance can cause many adverse effects. As a first 
illustration, the desire to stand out in a ranking can lead managers to overly focus on a 
task at which they are relatively good, while neglecting other responsibilities (Hannan et 
al., 2013). Relative performance evaluation (RPE) can also lead to sabotaging others’ 
performance to improve one’s own ranking (Hartmann & Schreck, 2018). Other 
potential negative effects include complacency and giving up effects (e.g., Berger et al., 
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2013). That is, top ranked individuals with a big lead and bottom ranked individuals who 
trail far behind can exhibit lower motivation levels due to the increased transparency 
about individual ranks. 
Despite the abovementioned potential downsides to relative performance evaluations, 
RPE can be very beneficial. Research shows quite consistent evidence that effort and 
performance increase when rankings are employed in a measurement and evaluation 
system (e.g., Hannan et al., 2013; Tafkov, 2013). The results of one of my studies, with 
Stephan Kramer and Victor Maas, demonstrate that this performance enhancing effect 
of relative performance information also holds without explicit rankings. Our study also 
investigated whether the order in which relative performance information is presented, 
from best-to-worst, worst-to-best, or in random order, differentially affects 
performance. We find no order effects, on average, on the magnitude of the 
performance increase. For bottom performers, however, a worst-to-best order appears 
to be most motivating (Kramer, Maas, & Van Rinsum, 2016). These studies on relative 
performance information and evaluation show that social comparison processes, rather 
than (just) economic incentives, strongly affect the motivation of managers and 
employees.
Discretion and transparency. Thus far, I have discussed upfront transparency. 
An objective measurement system, the information policy and relative performance 
evaluation systems are generally clear and known to subordinate managers and 
employees at the beginning of the evaluation period. The preceding sections 
highlighted that each form of transparency has its pros and cons, and that it is not 
possible to provide generic advice on the optimal level. Any such advice requires 
tailoring to organizational circumstances (e.g., competition level, culture, the risk and 
impact of sabotage and manipulation). 
I have also argued that discretion is often a valuable aspect of any measurement and 
evaluation system, which implies that we need to be willing to accept lower levels of 
ex ante transparency. Does that mean that discretion is at odds with transparency in 
measurement and accountability systems? Not necessarily. 
To illustrate, recall the prior discussion indicating that a major advantage of discretion is 
filtering out noise. It can be used as a tool to adjust evaluations for unforeseen, 
uncertain outside factors that influence performance outcomes. Note that accounting 
research distinguishes three basic types of discretion in performance measurement and 
evaluation systems (e.g., Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003), that determine how 
evaluations can be adjusted: 
a. Using subjective measures. This category refers to indicators that involve a rating  
by the superior. Examples include scoring subordinates on indicators such as 
‘organizational commitment’ or ‘being a team player’ on a scale of 1 to 5. A subjective 
measure enabling a supervisor to take into account uncertain factors could be a 
rating on ‘responsiveness to outside factors’.
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b. Flexibility in weighting objective measures. This type of discretion involves a set of 
objective measures, without a preset weight on each of these measures for the 
determination of the evaluation outcome. If a manager attempts to game the system 
by lowering quality or long-term investments to boost short run profit, the former 
measures could be assigned a higher weight, while profit may be weighted lower. 
Thus, supervisors can use their discretion in (re )setting the weights to penalize any 
dysfunctional behavior ex post. Moreover, managers anticipating this use of 
discretion have less incentive to engage in such behavior. In the preceding example 
concerning adjustment for uncertain outside factors, the relative weight on the profit 
measure could be varied by the supervisor, depending on whether the manager 
should have been able to foresee that the outside factor would influence results. 
c. Ex post discretionary adjustments. This represent the broadest type of discretion, 
which allows supervisors to make additions and adjustments ex post to any preset 
(nonbinding) performance measurement system. For instance, additional 
performance criteria can be specified ex post and incorporated into a manager’s 
evaluation, or a bonus amount calculated based on a standard formula can be 
adjusted ex post. 
Adjusting evaluations for unforeseen influences of outside factors is possible with all 
three forms, although the last type of discretion appears to involve the most flexibility. 
Thus, the level of ex post transparency of the evaluation system may well depend on 
the type of discretion. Under (a), any correction will be in one or more subjective 
measures. Provided that an appropriate measure is available, such as ‘responsiveness to 
outside factors’, it can be clear to the evaluatee how and why the evaluation outcome 
came about. Under (b), varying weights will be apparent. Under (c), an explanation by 
the supervisor seems paramount to provide ex post transparency about the evaluation 
criteria employed. In practice, the latter may hold in many cases, as mixed forms of 
these discretion types can and often do occur. Thus, if the discretionary evaluation 
process is managed well by the supervisor, it can still be relatively transparent. Feedback 
quality, procedural justice, and trust are important factors in this process (Bellavance, 
Landry, & Schiehll, 2013; Hartmann & Slapniçar, 2009).
When discretion is applied, a supervisor may incorporate the actions/decisions taken  
by a manager into his or her evaluation, as we saw above in the example about 
responding to outside factors affecting performance. This brings me to the different 
ways of holding managers accountable, which are very much interwoven with 
performance measurement and discretion. 
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5. Accountability for performance
In this section, I pay attention to alternative ways of holding managers accountable and 
how they relate to discretion and objective measurement systems.
Accountability types. Holding managers accountable, and the way this is done, is of 
significant influence on judgment and decision-making (e.g., Libby, Salterio & Webb, 2004; 
Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Utilizing a performance measurement system involving 
objective and/or subjective performance measures exemplifies mostly outcome 
accountability. Under this type of accountability, managers are responsible for the 
outcomes of their decisions. It is commonly used in organizations and is similar to ‘results’ 
or ‘output’ control (Anthony et al., 2014; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2018).
When broad discretion is employed and supervisors take managers’ actions into account 
when evaluating their performance, another form of accountability, namely process 
accountability becomes relevant. Under process accountability, supervisors evaluate their 
subordinate managers based on the quality of the explanations and justifications of their 
decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), rather than on the outcomes. Process accountability 
potentially offers benefits in conditions of uncertainty, because managers should take 
decisions that are optimal ex ante. Focusing evaluations on the decision process rather 
than on an uncontrollable, uncertain outcome can lead to better evaluations and decisions 
under such circumstances. Unless process accountability is applied based on a fixed and 
predetermined set of decision rules, discretion forms an integral part of it. 
Accountability and decision-making. The psychology literature documents several 
potentially beneficial effects of process accountability, such as increased and more 
systematic information processing (De Dreu et al., 2006). Judgment and decision-making 
quality generally appears to be better under process than outcome accountability (Libby et 
al., 2004; Patil, Vieider, & Tetlock, 2014; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Nevertheless, the 
literature also suggests that benefits of process accountability have their limits. Higher 
levels of information processing potentially cause over-attention to non-diagnostic 
information, leading to a dilution effect that can adversely affect judgment and decision 
quality (Bartlett, Johnson, & Reckers, 2014; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock & 
Boettger, 1989). Moreover, setting characteristics such as task complexity, can determine if 
and to what extent process accountability is beneficial (Chang et al., 2017; De Langhe, van 
Osselaer, & Wierenga, 2011; Patil, Tetlock, & Mellers, 2016). 
Somewhat surprisingly, little evidence of the influence of accountability type on 
decision-making exists in the managerial accounting literature (Chang, Cheng, & Trotman, 
2013). One of my recent studies, with Nicola Dalla Via and Paolo Perego, addresses this 
gap in the literature. We studied how accountability type affects decision-making quality. 
Participants in our experiment were asked to make a project funding decision based on 
information about the project’s performance effects, that could be extracted from BSC 
data. Using eye-tracking technology, we find that individuals exert higher search efforts 
under process accountability than under outcome accountability, in conditions where they 
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have no ex ante causal cues. We also find higher decision-making quality under process 
accountability in these conditions. These findings are consistent with our theory that 
having to provide explanations for their decisions makes individuals more motivated and 
better able to infer the causal performance effects of the project. In contrast, under 
outcome accountability, individuals fare far worse in terms of decision quality in situations 
where they lack causal cues. However, both accountability types result in similar decision 
quality levels when individuals are provided with causal cues in the BSC. These cues can 
take the form of a strategy map or causal chain that outlines relationships between 
performance dimensions (e.g., Humphreys, Gary, & Trotman, 2016; Tayler, 2010). 
Nevertheless, even with such cues, process accountability is beneficial because it makes 
the search process more efficient than under outcome accountability. That is, managers 
then need to exert less search effort to reach an identical decision quality level. In sum, 
process accountability leads to greater search effort and better decisions when causal 
cues are absent, and results in similar decision quality and a more efficient search process 
when causal information is provided in the BSC (Dalla Via, Perego & Van Rinsum, 2019). 
Hence, our study shows that the benefits of process accountability for decision-making 
depend on the format employed in the performance measurement system. We also 
demonstrate that when the performance measurement system does not provide causal 
cues, outcome accountability can lead to (very) poor decision quality.
Accountability and discretion. Pleas for more objective measurement are typically also 
requests to further increase outcome accountability, a much-used form of accountability. 
Yet as the abovementioned literature shows, process accountability can improve 
decision-making. 
Recall that process accountability typically involves discretion, though not always. If a 
decision process is spelled out precisely and the rules that need to be followed to reach a 
certain decision are laid out in detail ex ante, no meaningful discretion is involved. In this 
case, process accountability equates to simple forms of ‘action’ control (Merchant & Van 
der Stede, 2018). Yet in cases where the rules are not and/or cannot be precisely defined 
ex ante, discretion is needed. An example of where both discretion and process 
accountability could and probably should be employed is the previously mentioned 
one-time specific project funding decision. Process accountability can certainly be useful 
if applied to such a relatively infrequent and complex investment decision (Dalla Via et al., 
2019). It can apply more generally, too. In the previous section, I provided an example of 
how discretion can be implemented when managers are confronted with uncertain events 
that affect their performance outcomes. Discretion then helps to augment performance 
information stemming from the measurement system in place — and given that 
supervisors assess the quality of managers’ decisions on how to respond or anticipate, this 
is similar to process accountability. Thus, we see a mixture of accountability types 
embedded in the measurement and evaluation system.
A good performance measurement system requires a balance between objectivity and 
discretion, and similarly, the right mix between outcome and process accountability. As I 
elaborate next, accounting research could benefit from integrating insights from the 
separate research streams on discretion and accountability, which so far have not 
extensively drawn upon each other’s insights.
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6. In control in Control: A route forward
Below I describe future research opportunities on discretion and accountability, which 
also represents my research agenda. Additionally, I discuss new research methods. 
Topics for future research. The accounting literature on discretion has advanced 
considerably in recent years, and as a result we have learned much about the benefits 
and costs of discretion and how and when organizations should and do use it. 
Nevertheless, many opportunities for further advancement of our knowledge exist. 
First, most studies have concentrated their attention either on the determinants of 
discretion (e.g., Bushman et al., 1996; Gibbs et al., 2004), or on the use of discretion by 
the superior. We have learned that superiors suffer from biases in their evaluations (e.g., 
Bol, 2011; Moers, 2005), but also that they use their discretion to filter out noisy 
uncontrollable influences (e.g., Bol et al., 2015; Maas, Van Rinsum & Towry, 2012). 
Studies investigating the effects of supervisor’s use of discretion on subordinates’ 
attitudes and behavior, however, are less common (Moers, 2005). Studies have mostly 
assumed that superiors are able to correctly anticipate evaluatees’ responses. At first 
glance, this is not a far-fetched assumption, but the results of some studies suggest that 
deducing employees’ responses is not always straightforward. For instance, Bol et al. 
(2015) show that adjustments that make individuals’ evaluation fairer are perhaps not 
perceived as fair when compensation interdependence is present. When the total 
bonus pool consists of a fixed amount, adjusting the bonus amount of one individual 
upward requires reducing another individual’s bonus. Such a reduction is deemed unfair 
if the other individual’s performance remained constant, despite the fact that such an 
adjustment would be equitable, i.e., in line with both individuals’ relative efforts. As 
another example, Bol’s (2011) results suggest somewhat counterintuitively that leniency 
bias, i.e., rating individuals better than they deserve, leads to higher performance. Thus, 
biases that help supervisors avoid political costs from complaints and thus seem 
primarily driven by the supervisor’s self-interest, work out beneficially for the 
organization. Overall, however, little direct evidence exists on the effect of discretionary 
evaluations adjustments on subordinates’ perception of fairness. The same holds for the 
potential of discretionary adjustments to constrain dysfunctional behavior such as 
gaming and myopia. Discretion clearly provides incentives for subordinates to limit 
dysfunctional behavior, as compared to an objective measurement system. But that 
benefit of discretion may be partially undone if the perceived fairness of evaluation 
outcomes is low, for instance, due to biases in the evaluations. Hence, there are 
numerous possibilities for researchers to look into why, how, and under which 
circumstances discretion affects organizational outcomes such as fairness, trust, and 
performance. Moreover, there are plenty of opportunities for more research into 
decision-making in managerial accounting, as recently pointed out by colleagues in the 
field (e.g., Brüggen, 2018). This also holds for discretion; the effects thereof on effort 
direction and decision-making quality require additional attention. 
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Second, studies investigating discretion have only relatively recently begun to 
distinguish between the effects of different types of discretion (Bellavance et al., 2013). 
Evidence thus far suggests that broader forms of discretion do not necessarily work 
advantageously. For instance, Bailey, Hecht and Towry (2011) show that partial 
discretion over a bonus pool can lead to a higher degree of adjustment for 
uncontrollable influences made by supervisors, relative to broader discretion. Moreover, 
Höppe and Moers (2011) indicate that applying the ‘flexible weighting’ variant of 
discretion is more beneficial in motivating managers to anticipate outside influences. 
These studies suggest that more purposeful, ‘earmarked’ forms of discretion can work 
better than other forms. More research is needed to determine if each form of 
discretion influences important outcomes, such as fairness, trust, motivation, 
decision-making, and performance, differentially. Additionally, we need to nail down 
the main drivers of any such differential effects, which potentially include the 
subordinate’s perception of the purposefulness and transparency of each discretionary 
part of the evaluation system (Hartmann & Slapniçar, 2009; Van Rinsum, 2015). In other 
words, we need to look deeper into the process of discretionary evaluations and how 
this relates to the type of discretion.
A third promising avenue for future research relates to promotion decisions. 
Promotions represent an under-investigated type of discretionary evaluation decisions. 
These decisions differ from regular periodic evaluation and bonus decisions in the 
sense that they are not only meant to incentivize performance in the current job, but 
they should also serve the purpose of selecting individuals who will likely be most 
productive in the future job (e.g., Grabner & Moers, 2013). Together with Gary Hecht 
and Victor Maas, I conducted a study that aims to contribute to the recent stream of 
accounting research investigating managers’ promotion decisions (e.g., Bol & Leiby, 
2018; Chan, 2018; Grabner & Moers, 2013). We examine how the design of the 
performance measurement and incentive system affects managers’ tendencies to act 
strategically in promotion decisions. Managers act strategically if they do not promote 
the best performer, but rather another employee, because they do not want to sacrifice 
a highly productive member from their current team. Our experimental study shows 
that transparency and group incentives affect managers’ propensity to promote 
employees strategically. Specifically, group incentives align managers’ and employees’ 
incentives such that it is in both their interests not to lose high performers from the 
team, and our evidence suggests that managers tend to use this as an excuse to 
promote strategically. Transparency about each other’s performance among 
employees, however, has an opposite effect. Higher transparency causes managers to 
give more weight to considerations of fairness and makes them less inclined to abstain 
from promoting the best performer (Hecht, Maas, & Van Rinsum, 2019). Thus, we show 
a positive effect of transparency. Transparency has, however, also been shown to 
negatively affect the quality of promotion decisions (Chan, 2018). Again, we see benefits 
and costs of transparency, but we still have much to learn about this type of 
discretionary decisions, and the effects of the performance measurement and incentive 
system thereon. 
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Accountability type represents a fourth avenue for further investigation. Few studies 
have investigated hybrid forms of outcome and process accountability (Patil et al., 
2014), while we typically see these mix forms in evaluation systems in practice. In 
accounting, we should learn more about the effects of accountability types and hybrid 
systems on decision-making. Accounting researchers can investigate how decision-
making quality under such systems varies with reporting format, and with the 
performance measures and incentives that are used. Given that process accountability 
typically involves discretion, examining this aligns well with the above outlined research 
agenda for discretion. Building on the insights about how discretion is used by superiors 
and keeping in mind the pros and cons of discretion can greatly benefit further study of 
process and hybrid accountability systems. For instance, we need to understand if and 
when supervisors’ biases play a significant role in the efficacy of these systems. 
We thus need to tie the insights on discretion and accountability together. So far, 
studies on accountability type have mainly investigated effects on subordinates’ 
judgment and decision-making, without focusing on the supervisor’s evaluation 
decisions or process. Few of these studies are in an accounting context. Accounting 
studies have focused on discretionary evaluation decisions, but less on their effects and 
also less on the process involved. We need to tie the insights from these two streams of 
literature together, and further investigate the effects of the supervisor’s evaluation 
process on evaluatees’ decision-making, to come full circle. I look forward to 
conducting further research on these topics. 
New research methods. I would like to advocate reflection on and improvement of our 
research methods, as I elaborate next. 
First, many studies in the field of Accounting & Incentives use either the experimental or 
the archival method. Survey studies are a viable and valid research method, but they are 
currently less popular and seem to have too little publication potential. As mainly an 
experimental researcher myself, I find this a regrettable situation. Experimental studies 
require abstracting, boiling empirical testing down to the essential causal mechanism 
indicated by theory. But we can only develop theory when we are inspired by and build 
on findings from other studies, and are able to provide practical contributions. Evidence 
about organizational practices obtained from survey studies and, for example, quotes 
from field studies can help in this regard. Hence, it is a pity that they currently seem 
underemployed. I hope we will see more initiatives like the recent Special Interest 
Forum on Survey Research in the Journal of Management Accounting Research (vol. 
30, no. 2, 2018). Consistent triangulation, the use of multiple methods, is key to 
advancing our knowledge, and experimental research is greatly assisted by evidence 
obtained from studies employing different methods. 
Second, when conducting experimental research, a challenging aspect is how to set 
the stage as part of the overall design of an experiment. Independent variables are 
manipulated, while all other factors are kept constant. These other factors pertain to 
the study’s setting characteristics, such as the task and its framing. Experimentalists 
need to make choices about these characteristics, which should be informed and 
driven by theory as much as possible. These choices are not always easily made.  
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Yet how we set the stage may affect our inferences. For example, when studying the 
use and/or effects of discretion the type of discretion may affect a study’s outcomes. 
In a similar vein, the framing of the setting can be an important factor. For instance, do 
we make participants aware of why we endowed a supervisor with discretion? In 
experimental studies and in practice, responses in terms of attitude and behavior may 
well depend on this framing (Van Rinsum, 2015). Managers may find a discretionary 
adjustment to their evaluation much fairer when they are fully aware of its purpose, and 
are fully informed by their company (or: in the experimental setting) that the reason for 
endowing the supervisor with discretion is to ‘enable a correction for uncertainty’. 
That is, elaborating on the process and providing a rationale for it, as opposed to just 
factually communicating the discretion to adjust, could influence results. 
Note that my points are not meant as critique – as experimental researchers, we all face 
choices and trade-offs in our design. Rather, it implies (1) that we should carefully 
report and reflect on design choices made in our work and (2) that design choices 
made can inspire future research whenever they may limit generalization. Thus, we 
should process studies in depth, including the method employed, as inspiration for 
follow-up studies that extend and generalize our insights. Additionally, we should not 
adopt an existing instrument too easily for any new study, but carefully reconsider its 
setting characteristics and framing. Although an existing instrument is easier to ‘sell’, 
and may well be appropriate for a follow-up study, we need to watch out that we do 
not end up with sub-streams of literature with results that are driven by a particular 
setting. Ergo, we need ‘triangulation’ of experimental research, too.
Finally, new methods have become available due to technological advances. As a result, 
we have an opportunity to generate deeper insights about the processes underlying 
judgment and decision-making based on accounting information. Adopting insights 
and methods from neuroscience provides one such potentially fruitful opportunity (e.g., 
Eskenazi, Hartmann, & Rietdijk, 2016). Another available method, that requires a smaller 
upfront investment, is eye-tracking technology (Dalla Via, Perego, & Van Rinsum, 2019). 
This method has become more cost-effective and flexible relatively recently, which 
even facilitates taking it into the field to conduct tests with practitioners as participants. 
Employing these new methods can and should advance research in our field.
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7. In control in Control: Our system 
The opportunities for further research as I outlined in the previous section will bring the 
field of Accounting & Control, which has made significant progress in the past 
decennia, (even) more in control. Triangulation and applying new methods holds 
significant promise for advancement. 
But what about our own performance measurement, evaluation, and incentive system? 
Below, I apply insights from research in this field to our own working environment. 
Evaluating academics. A core point I made about measurement and evaluation systems 
is that they should be balanced, in particular with respect to objectivity and discretion, 
as well as with respect to outcome and process accountability. In our line of work, 
research productivity represents a very important aspect of performance. Research 
output, in terms of publications in top journals, is an often-used indicator for research 
productivity. As any indicator, it is imperfect; conducting a good research study is not 
necessarily a guarantee for a top publication in a timely fashion. An excellent study will 
typically find a good outlet, but there is uncertainty regarding the outcome at any given 
journal based on a regularly lengthy review process involving a low number of referees. 
The process from submission to publication or rejection at a given journal can easily 
take two years or more. Given the uncertainty involved, a level of discretion is called for. 
Moreover, a number of other highly relevant criteria such as teaching, the role of 
co-authors, innovativeness, creativity, organizational commitment, and (potential) 
impact provide more reasons for having discretion built into our evaluation system. This 
is particularly relevant for promotion decisions. Similarly, we need a mixture of outcome 
and process accountability in evaluation decisions. Certainly, accountability for 
outcomes provides a clear and important motivator. Allowing for professional judgment 
of each evaluatee’s process behind the performance outcomes, however, is also crucial 
for the reasons outlined above. 
Of course, the optimal degree and use of discretion can vary per field and institution, 
and minimum objective targets do and should vary. It is up to each of us and each 
business school to reflect on and determine the appropriate level of discretion. Hence, 
my points should be seen as a guideline and reminder for (re )design and not as a 
critique of any specific system. In my opinion, it is clear that objectivity and ex ante 
transparency are not goals in themselves and we cannot fully rely on them. Important is 
that discussions about promotion criteria, and for example about constructing and 
implementing measures of researchers’ impact, should acknowledge this and embrace 
the important role that professional judgment can and should play.
Journal review process. The number of articles we publish in top journals is one of our 
most important objective performance indicators. I would like to share a few musings 
about the review process that underlies our publications and hence affects this 
performance measure. My thoughts apply to the field of Accounting, but may also be 
relevant to business research in general and other fields. 
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More transparency, flexibility, and interactivity could help to improve the review process 
and its outcomes. More interaction facilitates information exchange and academic 
dialogue, and by incorporating this the review process could benefit even more from 
the discretion and professional judgment that is already involved. For example, by 
making optimal use of the possibilities offered by information technology, we, as a 
community, could create possibilities to allow authors to anonymously ask clarifying 
questions to reviewers about their comments. Another possibility is to allow author(s) a 
brief first response option to reviewers’ reports before a decision is made, particularly in 
the first round. Process accountability is again key. Especially more innovative research 
sometimes requires more additional explanation, which is occasionally hard to predict 
by author(s). A more interactive review procedure can facilitate elucidation of the 
choices that were made in research studies and may prevent too many first-round 
rejections (which seem to be on the increase). Of course, if a rejection is the ultimate 
result, it should better come sooner rather than later. But early rejections should never 
be a goal in themselves, and they should not occur too frequently. They preclude the 
opportunity for exchanging thoughts, which would perhaps lead to a revision of initial 
beliefs and impressions and to reaching a mutual understanding. Thus, I believe we 
have much to gain as a community from increased interaction, and we should be open 
to rethinking the current process, which entails predominantly one-way 
communication following the submission of a paper. Let’s experiment! Doing so may 
improve an objective indicator that is an important input to our evaluations. 
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8. Conclusion
Objectivity often seems a desirable aspect of a performance measurement and 
evaluation system. But to provide congruent incentives, a degree of subjectivity is often 
desirable. Although it may lead to bias, it offers a much-needed possibility for 
incorporating professional judgment into managers’ evaluations. Given the positive 
aspects to subjectivity and its negative connotation with bias, we should use the neutral 
label discretion to disseminate insights from accounting research to managers and 
others. We need to acknowledge the important role of discretion for organizations, 
including our own working environment. 
With objectivity comes ex ante transparency in performance measurement. 
Yet transparency is a much broader term as it also applies to the availability of performance 
information to peers. More transparency in this respect has pros and cons, and like 
objectivity, transparency is not always optimal. Furthermore, discretion is not necessarily at 
odds with transparency, provided there is a relatively clear process and rationale behind a 
supervisor’s discretionary evaluation — which delivers ex post transparency. 
To move forward, we need to tie the insights on discretion together with those from the 
accountability literature. Process accountability typically involves a judgment by the 
superior and can positively affect subordinates’ judgment and decision-making. But as 
of yet we lack precise knowledge about how the type of discretion, the framing of the 
role of the superior, and the process involved in a discretionary evaluation decision 
affect subordinates’ behavior. The experimental method is often used to investigate 
related questions, and new methods such as eye tracking can significantly advance our 
knowledge by revealing underlying judgment and decision-making processes. But we 
also need more survey and field research to help further theory building and to identify 
practically relevant questions. Additionally, we need to consider if and how our 
experimental design choices potentially affect the generalizability of our findings, as we 
reflect on setting characteristics and framing. In practice, the framing of performance 
evaluation systems and situations likely matters, and our understanding of discretionary 
evaluations can benefit from investigating variations of these. In sum, triangulation in 
terms of applying diverse methods and experimental settings holds much promise for 
extending our knowledge about discretion and accountability.
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9. Word of thanks
Time to embark on a somewhat risky endeavor. I am grateful to many people who have 
helped me get to this stage in my career, directly or indirectly, and it is a daunting task 
to list all of them. I hope I do not inadvertently leave anyone out, but if so, please know 
your support is much appreciated!
First, I would like to thank all those who were directly involved in my appointment, 
including the Rector Magnificus, College van Decanen, Dean of RSM, the advisory 
appointment committee, my department head (at the time) Erik Peek, and the Erasmus 
Trust fund. 
I wish to thank Frank Hartmann and Erik Peek for their guidance in academia 
throughout the years. Let me start at the beginning. Frank, during my time as a PhD 
student you were a great source of inspiration and motivation as my supervisor. And 
you still are, in discussions of ‘the bigger picture’. Erik, your continual support and 
friendliness is much appreciated. During the past years, you have shown confidence in 
me, confided in me, and provided advice when I needed it. Thank you for creating a 
pleasurable everyday environment. 
I also wish to express my gratitude to all my other current RSM and ESE colleagues. 
Working and interacting with you is a pleasure and makes serving as Chair of RSM’s 
Department of Accounting and Control an enjoyable experience for me.
My appreciation also extends to my former colleagues, two of which I would like to 
thank specifically: Victor Maas and Paolo Perego. All three of us started our careers at 
the University of Amsterdam, where we conducted a large project and had a great time 
together as starting academics. Victor, it is always a true pleasure to work and interact 
with you. Our intense discussions about research not only improved our studies, but 
they were also thoroughly enjoyable. I hope we will continue to work together and 
interact as good friends for many more years; much looking forward to it! Paolo, you 
were a tremendous guide in teaching and literature. Your kindness and professionalism 
is highly appreciated. Please stay in touch; Italy is not that far… 
My thanks also go to Stephan Kramer, for his support, and for our friendly interactions 
at work and beyond in the past years and hopefully, for many more to come. 
And for my other (ex-)colleagues that I did not mention by name, please know that 
your collegiality is also greatly appreciated!
Furthermore, I thank all my co-authors; it was a great pleasure and honor to conduct 
research together with you. Other guides and supporters in research for me were, 
among others, Mike Shields, Kristy Towry, and Jan Bouwens. Thanks for your kindness, 
input and friendliness! 
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Last but not least, I wish to thank my parents, family, and friends. I suspect that some of 
you think that I have a somewhat peculiar job. But it is a great job, and it suits me; I was 
called professor at school from an early age, and I am thrilled that it has become a 
reality. Family and friends, your love and support have proven indispensable for my 
achievements. Thank you so much!
Ik heb gezegd.
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